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Executive Summary 
As we enter the control phase of the COVID-19 
pandemic, many efforts have been dedicated to 
developing smartphone-based contact tracing apps in 
order to automatically identify people that a person 
with COVID-19 might have infected. These 
applications while potentially useful, present 
significant adoption, societal, technical and privacy 
challenges. 
We propose ACDC-Tracing, a simpler, anonymous, 
voucher-based contact tracing solution that relies on 
peoples’ knowledge of their own close contacts. People 
who test positive are given an anonymous voucher 
which they can share with a limited number of people 
whom they think they might be infected. The recipients 
can use this voucher to book a COVID-19 test and can 
receive their test results without ever revealing their 
identity. People receiving positive result are given 
vouchers to further backtrack the path of infection. 
This is a fully anonymous solution which does not 
require any sharing of location data, Bluetooth, or 
having an app installed on people’s mobile device. 
Moreover, ACDC-Tracing can be tested for 
effectiveness at a small scale without requiring 
adoption by the entire population, which would enable 
acquiring fast evidence about its efficacy and 
scalability. Finally, it is compatible with and 
complementary to alternative approaches to contact 
tracing. 
Introduction 
As we enter the control phase of the COVID-19 
pandemic, early detection of a significant portion of all 
infected individuals will be of critical importance, so 
that they can be placed in quarantine and thus avoid 
further contagion. To achieve this, several key 
infrastructures need to be in place, including (1) the 
ability to perform daily massive amounts of tests, (2) 
a person-centric end-to-end protocol for isolating 
infected or vulnerable individuals, (3) special 
measures for individuals in high-risk, high-spread 
professions, such as healthcare personnel and nursing 
home workers; and (4) the ability to give tests to the 
right people to quickly identify new sources of 
infection.  
 
Contact Tracing via Smartphone Apps 
It is regarding this last point --the detection of infected 
individuals and their contacts—where the concept of 
contact tracing via smartphone apps arises. To date, 
several app proposals with varying levels of privacy 
implications have been made to track contacts in order 
to quickly find possible infections when someone tests 
positive for COVID-19. Unfortunately, most of these 
proposals – and even the most privacy-preserving 
ones, such as the SafePaths project at MIT1 and the 
PEPP-PT project in Europe2 – have several limitations, 
including: 
 
• Critical mass: To be effective, it is estimated 
that at least 60% of the population3 must be 
running the application. To make it even more 
challenging, in Europe only 76% of the 
population has smartphones capable of 
running these apps4. This is as high as 82% in 
the UK and as low as 58% in Italy5, with 
prominent socio-economic and demographic 
differences. For example, younger children, 
who can spread the illness without having 
symptoms, generally do not have 
smartphones. 
• Privacy and potential misuse: These apps 
require citizens to record very personal data, 
which may make people reluctant to run the 
app once they realize the potential 
consequences of misuse (even in the case 
when data is only stored locally on their 
phone). For example, could law enforcement 
oblige someone to unlock their phone and 
analyze it to determine all the people they 
have been in contact with? In a domestic 
violence or divorce situation, could someone 
deliberately misreport, or threaten to 
misreport, an infection on their partner’s 
phone? Once this app is present on everyone’s 
phone, will governments be tempted to use 
contact tracing for other purposes? When 
receiving a notification from their phone, will 
people try to figure out who they got it from, 
potentially starting malicious rumors? 
  
• Cybersecurity: Many of these mobile apps are 
being developed very quickly by new, relatively 
immature software development teams, 
which could result in serious security 
vulnerabilities6. Magnifying the problem, since 
the same software would be used across an 
entire country, this would present an 
extremely high-value target for both state-
based and non-state-based bad actors7. 
• Accuracy: Phone-based urban geolocation is 
only accurate to about 10 meters8, and 
research using Bluetooth LE for proximity 
tracing has been mostly done in controlled 
environments with known hardware9. Accuracy 
is especially important in apartment buildings 
where many people are close by measured 
distance, but not necessarily sharing the same 
physical space. The result of these 
inaccuracies could generate a very large set of 
people to test, creating an immense demand 
for testing with many false positives.  
As part of the insights10 from the analysis of the 
answers to the Covid19ImpactSurvey, we found that a 
high proportion (over 70%) of people that tested 
positive could identify their likely source of infection 
(e.g. a member of their household, a relative, a friend, 
a patient, client or co-worker). This finding made us 
consider whether a much simpler solution could 
consist of simply asking people whom they might have 
infected and scale this process to work with a large 
number of people. 
ACDC-Tracing 
The proposed solution, called Anonymous Citizen-
Driven Contact Tracing (ACDC-Tracing), would work as 
follows: 
1. Person X receives a positive diagnosis for COVID-
19. As part of receiving this diagnosis, Person X is 
given a “COVID-19 testing voucher”, which 
consists of a short alpha-numeric code. This 
voucher could be provided either via SMS, e-mail, 
a randomly selected sealed envelope or whatever 
other mechanism makes sense depending on the 
testing protocol of the country. This voucher is not 
connected to the identity of Person X. 
2. Person X is told that they can share this code with 
up to 6 people, which is an upper bound of the 
estimated reproductive number for COVID-1911. 
This number would be adjusted based on the 
findings of an initial pilot. Person X would be asked 
to distribute these vouchers to the people they 
think they might have infected.  
3. The recipients of the code can use it to book an 
appointment for receiving a COVID-19 test at a 
web site provided by the government or by a 
private testing facility. The web site does not 
require the recipient to identify themselves; it only 
validates that the code has not been used more 
than 6 times and gives a confirmation code with a 
testing location and a date/time. 
4. The recipient goes to the testing facility, presents 
the confirmation code and is given the test. The 
next day, the recipient can check the results of 
their test either e.g. online or by phone using only 
their confirmation code (which would be fully 
anonymous). Recipients that test positive would 
again receive a voucher that would allow them to 
follow the same process as above. 
No Critical Mass Required to be Effective 
Phone based contact tracing proposals require a large 
uptake by the general population before being 
effective, and do not prove their value until a critical 
mass is reached.  
A key advantage of ACDC-Tracing is that it can be 
evaluated and tested at a small scale to prove its 
effectiveness. 
Privacy 
There are several key points concerning privacy 
preservation in this proposal: 
1. Vouchers are not tied to identity. The only 
thing that needs to be tracked is the number 
of times that a voucher has been used. Once 
this is done, all information related to that 
voucher can be erased.  
1. Patient receives positive 
diagnosis, receives testing 
voucher
2. Patient shares COVID-19 
testing voucher with a 
limited number of likely 
infection recipients
3. Recipient uses testing 
voucher to book a test, 
receives confirmation code 
assigned by the testing 
facility
4. Recipient goes to testing 
facility with confirmation 
code, can retrieve 
diagnosis using only the 
confirmation code
  
2. No trusted 3rd party involvement is required in 
the communication between the infected 
person and the possible recipients. Person X 
can send the voucher via their preferred 
means of communication, by phone, by an 
encrypted WhatsApp conversation, etc. 
3. No personal data is stored on any mobile 
device --or anywhere for that matter-- that 
could be compromised by security breaches. 
Integration with phone-based contact tracing 
ACDC-Tracing is complementary to other contact 
tracing approaches and could be integrated into a 
phone-based solution. For example, instead of just 
notifying people that they have been in close contact 
with an infected individual, a contact-tracing app could 
provide an anonymous single-use voucher that would 
allow people to immediately get tested, using the 
same infrastructure already created for ACDC-Testing. 
Discussion  
The proposed approach is scalable, technologically 
simple and fully privacy preserving, while at the same 
time taking advantage of a “viral” model for tracing 
back the infection chain.  We believe that it could be 
implemented in a short time with a simple back-end 
infrastructure. It could even be implemented without 
any infrastructure using paper vouchers in sealed 
envelopes (with a matching checklist at the testing 
center). This could be especially important in areas 
where there is high risk of stigmatization due to a 
positive diagnosis, since no names or identification 
need to be recorded. 
While technology is a key element to help tackle the 
spread of COVID-19, important further considerations 
need to be taken into account for any early detection 
plus contact tracing approach, such as: (1) the 
availability of testing infrastructure for a large number 
of people; (2) the existence of a person-centric 
quarantine where people are not afraid to test positive; 
(3) the empowerment of and trust placed in citizens 
who would be the main source of the contact tracing; 
and (4) the development of incentives for 
asymptomatic, low-risk individuals to get tested if they 
were at risk of having contracted COVID-19. 
ACDC-Tracing is compatible with other contact tracing 
options. It could provide a fast, high-quality solution in 
a timely fashion. In addition, it allows us to quickly 
learn which types of contact tracing are most 
effective, providing valuable ground truth to develop 
models that identify which contacts are most likely to 
produce positive test results. 
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